IN REMEMBRANCE OF A COMRADE WHO NEVER LIVED TO SEE INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE

12 Apr, 2015 - 00:04 0 Views
IN REMEMBRANCE OF A COMRADE WHO NEVER LIVED TO SEE INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE Rogers (Alfred Nikita) Mangena

The Sunday News

ROGERS (ALFRED NIKITA) MANGENA

Rogers (Alfred Nikita) Mangena

Rogers (Alfred Nikita) Mangena

Brigadier General Abel Mazinyane (Retired)
HE was more than a good commander. He was a military genius. He made one do things one never believed they were capable of doing in the execution of the armed struggle. He had this rare gift among many military leaders I have met, “Firm and Fair”.

Under his leadership, ZPRA pinned down the Rhodesian army which had a highly efficient mobile army. The Rhodesian army was highly trained in anti-guerrilla warfare. The Rhodesian army had sent their officers to South Africa, Israel, US and Portugal for training. The Portuguese army had crafted an effective anti-guerrilla warfare strategy through General Ariaga.

This strategy involved de-populating areas where guerrillas were operating. In Rhodesia, it was the so-called protected villages.

All white Rhodesians (half-a-million of them) were armed and organised into various military formations that were part of the Rhodesian Defence Forces. Other races were also forcibly drafted into the defence of Rhodesia. The police (BSAP) was turned into an anti-guerrilla force. Rhodesia had about 40 000 men under arms 24/7.

The Rhodesian government even created units who operated outside the parameters of international military norms, eg the Selous Scouts. This unit was not subject to the Rhodesian Defence Act or Geneva Convention. They were more of a private army. Their speciality was infiltrating guerrilla ranks or operating separately as pseudo guerrilla units. This unit could kidnap, torture and execute anyone it considered a threat to their operations.

Despite all the above sophistication, the Rhodesian Defence Forces were made to chase shadows by the ZPRA High Command led by Alfred Nikita Mangena. The command included people like VP Phelekezela Mphoko, Cephas Cele, Sotsha Ngwenya (JD), Tapson Sibanda (Terror) and Lookout Masuku. To me this was the most efficient and effective team. It achieved a lot with little resources. It laid a firm foundation for ZPRA.

I first met Nikita in Morogoro, Tanzania, early 1970. He was my military instructor. He always turned out in military gear and looking fit. When he gave a task he wanted it accomplished. I once tested his wrath at training during an exercise for an OAU delegation to demonstrate our readiness to be deployed for operations. I was the sapper (military engineer) of the section that was to conduct the demonstration. My task was to blow up a tree to block the OAU delegation which was the enemy for the purpose of our demonstration. Unfortunately, the explosive did not go off and the delegation drove through unmolested by our mock attack. The attack was to be triggered by my setting off the explosives. He made me investigate the electric cable from the battery to the explosives. The rule of thumb with explosives is that whenever one is carrying out the above investigation, he or she must be in possession of the source of power — the battery. Mangena kept the battery. Lucky for me the failure was caused by the rain that poured down heavily while we waited in ambush and the wet soil caused a short circuit where the wires had lost insulation.

I shall never forget these incidents because it tested my resolve to take orders as they were given. The ZPRA High Command under Mangena crafted a training programme that produced a very efficient ZPRA fighter, who could zero his/her rifle or machine gun for accuracy, manufacture explosives with local material, lay mines, disarm enemy mines, operate a few artillery weapons, conduct first aid and many other capabilities that made him/her the most feared guerrilla fighter south of the Zambezi. The ZPRA High Command under Mangena left no stone unturned to expose ZPRA fighters to military experiences, even attaching some to other liberation movements outside Africa to gain experience eg Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). During operations in Rhodesia ZPRA fighters instilled fear among Rhodesian soldiers that they were scared to sleep in tents out of fear of ZPRA fighters. I remember an incident when some ZPRA fighter inside Rhodesia annihilated an enemy platoon which as a precaution decided to sleep outside its bush camp, outside their tent. The Rhodesian soldiers were attacked at their new found safety haven. They should have not used perfumed soap “WAYA LAPHO ENGIYAKHONA”.

The ZPRA commander liked to throw a challenge to junior commanders. For instance, when regional commanders kept asking for reinforcements he gave an order that reinforcements shall be exchanged one for one, one trained guerilla for one recruit crossed into Zambia by the field commander requesting for reinforcement. This boomeranged on him as a trickle of recruits crossing the Zambezi suddenly turned into a deluge. Now the high command found itself begging for training centres far and wide; let alone poor ever hard working instructors who had to turn the rag tag army of recruits into perfect soldiers.

Poor Gagisa, Sigoge, Daki and others had to do the above.
When I was appointed to the ZPRA High Command I discovered that the grass was not greener on the other side. The job was highly demanding and demanded a lot of me. Mangena demanded a flow of well-written reports. He marked reports like examination papers just short of allocating marks. Cde Cephas Cele nicknamed him “Headmaster”.

He was a man of vision in that he always planned strategically against the enemy. For example, the Southern front (border Botswana/Rhodesia) was initiated as early as 1974. My dear comrade Matswaha found himself thrown at the deep end. He was sent to kick-start the operations. I was the first to be sent to Botswana in 1973 to assess the feasibility of opening the office in Francistown. I was excited about that possibility, it was only after meeting and talking to Matswaha in 1976 in Mozambique under Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) that I realised that it was not a walk in the park. The first female member of the ZAPU national executive to go out of Rhodesia to lead the armed struggle, Jane Ngwenya, was sometimes used as a transporter of armament for this front. The lady was dicing with death. The front operated with a full structure about four years later.

Comrade Mangena together with his colleagues in the ZPRA High Command introduced urban fighting units. These units faced challenges such as selection of members, training, armament, communication and resupply.

SELECTION: The selection was a challenge because it wanted people who could easily blend with urban society but not too familiar to have been missed during their absence when they joined the armed struggle. It was important to know if a member had a criminal record. Rhodesians were recruiting from prisons.

RESUPPLY: Resupply of these units was a challenge because their weapons had to be different. The supply route tedious and communications a nightmare. The objective of urban units was to create uncertainty among settlers. The settler government was desperate to keep whites believing it was on top of the situation. Farmers were abandoning their farms for urban safety. A bullet fired in town spelt doom for the government, as whites would leave in droves. Whites were the backbone of the settler regime. “Strategic planning Madala”, as my comrade Billy Mzamo would say.

Comrade Mangena was a disciplinarian. Any deviation from laid down procedures he did not tolerate. I remember a case of comrade Chiboyi. Comrade Chiboyi intercepted a white tourist who had strayed very close to their base at Chief Nkuni area near Victoria Falls on the Zambian side. The lady was photographing wildlife. Comrade Chiboyi intercepted her as she was heading straight for their base. As he was walking her back to Victoria Falls the lady suddenly bolted shouting “help, help!”, I think on arrival at her hotel she reported to the Zambian authorities because I was summoned by the commander and given orders to immediately go to Livingstone, arrest Chiboyi and hand him over to the Zambian authorities.

On arrival in Livingstone I was met by Matshimini, the regional commander, who persuaded me against handing over of Chiboyi to the Zambian authorities. One of the reasons he gave was, if Chiboyi was handed over to the Zambian authorities it would take a long time to clear his name and have him released. My orders were clear, Chiboyi had violated Zambian laws and he had to be locked up. ZPRA had to maintain good relations with the Zambian authorities. Chiboyi had to go. However, I approached the Zambian authorities to try and strike a favourable compromise. The security authorities were very sympathetic even suggesting that it would have been better if we had eliminated the suspect leaving no traces. I found this ridiculous.

When I reported back to Mangena that I was negotiating with Zambians he asked “is Chiboyi under arrest?” When I said “no” he became very angry. He later clearly told me that if Chiboyi is not in custody within an hour he was asking the Zambians to lock me up. I was caught between a rock and a hard surface. Anyway we had to resort to breaking into the lady’s hotel room to look for incriminating material and exonerate our comrade.

Things all ended well, our comrade did not see the inside of the Zambian jail.
The other case was of a comrade who had a misunderstanding with a Zambian citizen and I was ordered by the commander to go and hand him over to the Zambian authorities. Well, I thought this was a straightforward and simple mission. However, on arrival at the base I found out that the culprit had crossed the Zambezi and undertook an act of bravado. He had crossed into Rhodesia and brought back mementos of his bravery. These included enemy uniforms and body parts. He was now a hero.

For me, going back to the commander without accomplishing my mission meant that my chances of keeping my head on my shoulders were zero.

Thanks to all the gods and Mazinyane ancestors, JZ Moyo and JD immediately arrived at the base. I then gave a report to JD (chief of operations). Pheew! I was saved by the bell.

Under the leadership of Mangena, one ZPRA department that made strides was communication. This sub department became so sophisticated that the enemy was desperate to infiltrate it. One particular case in point is when the military intelligence intercepted an enemy agent that had been sent to infiltrate the ZPRA communications. During interrogation he claimed to be a disgruntled Rhodesian soldier who wanted to join the armed struggle. At this point I realised that we might have struck an intelligence gold mine (I was the chief of ZPRA intelligence). I requested the assistance of ZPRA director of communication (the chief ZPRA communication was brigadier General Ambrose Mutinhiri) (retired), comrade Zwafa (Elias Moyo) because this Rhodesian soldier had given me his regimental number. Zwafa, through his records discovered that this man was not a private soldier but a sergeant in the Rhodesian army with the signals corps. He had told me that he had been serving under one engineers company in Bulawayo but we discovered he had been stationed in Bindura. On giving him his details, he realised there was no need to tell us lies. ZPRA communication had been listening to Rhodesian army communication. ZPRA was deadly.

To be continued next week. . .

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