The Sunday News
Pathisa Nyathi
AS indicated three weeks ago, we sought to show and, where possible, pin down the sources of tension and conflict between regular-trained ZPRA cadres and their counterparts who were guerrilla-trained.
In a subsequent article we zeroed in on combat tactics for guerrillas with particular emphasis on their acquisition of a Marxist-Leninist ideology. That ideology was what guerrillas in the period after the internal strife in Zapu took to the masses in operational areas.
We then said we were going to contrast guerrilla with regular combat tactics and strategy. In a normal situation regular soldiers are people who sought employment and joined the army as a source for their sustenance. It was not to do with some political orientation or ideology.
They have families to support. They live in well-lit and fortified garrisons. They carry heavy weapons and a lot of ammunition. They have the support of air power through helicopters and jet fighters. Reinforcement for them is quick as they can fly to where they are needed within a short space of time-both as ground forces or air support.
They possess cars, actually troop carriers that ferry them. Their wounded are quickly ferried in ambulances and taken to military hospitals.
Medical supplies are generally readily available. They do not rely on civilians to treat their wounded. Communication is good and they rely on modern state of the art communications equipment designed and produced by big communications companies such as Plessey.
It was at the ideological level that the differences were most noticeable. Guerrillas, particularly in the Zimbabwean context, were strong on ideology. In the case of ZPRA guerrillas, it was the Marxist-Leninist ideology which was formally adopted following the restructuring of Zapu in exile in 1971.
The little booklet with a picture of Zapu leader Joshua Nkomo on it, was called the “Ideological Concept and Political Programme.” Guerrillas took it to the front with them. At least that was the case with ZPRA guerrillas who operated in Binga and Gokwe. For them, the booklet was for identification purposes and also their own political orientation. The view of these guerrillas was victory through the barrel of the gun.
They never countenanced a negotiated settlement as what happened at the end. Indeed, some of them abandoned the struggle and refused to get to assembly points arguing that the whole thing was a monumental sellout.
It was these characteristics of a regular or conventional army that informed their war strategies and related combat tactics. For our purposes here, focus is on the fact that ZPRA embraced both regular and guerrilla aspects within their forces. We saw the results of that in the field with regard to the entry of the advanced guerrilla-trained cadres from Hurungwe and those who were guerrilla-trained operating in Gokwe.
The border between their two regions within the same Northern Front (NF) was the Sanyati River. There were tensions and rivalries between the disparate training of the two and differences on emphasis on political ideology. By 1979, ZPRA was beginning to infiltrate their regular units into the fronts. Even the Southern Front (SF) began witnessing the arrival of regular units. In the case of the latter, there were tensions between the two till a meeting to iron out their differences was convened at Tudi 2. What prompted the infiltration was that a ceasefire was in the offing and Zapu was keen to strengthen their presence within their traditional operational zones. By that time Zanla had reached the Matobo Hills and were advancing towards the Bulawayo-Plumtree Road.
What was happening within ZPRA is what I have termed the domestication of the cold war contradictions with their tensions and divisions.
The cold war pitted the West (NATO) versus the East(Warsaw Pact). The domestication of the cold war that I am referring to is where, within the same army, ZPRA had aspects of the West, training according to western military traditions at Mulungushi and Kohima in Zambia. In fact, the military traditions were more specifically British, and devoid of teaching of Marxist-Leninist ideology.
The Zambian army, schooled in British military traditions were the instructors of ZPRA cadres both at Mulungushi and Kohima.
On the other hand, there were regulars at Luso and Boma in Angola who were trained by Cubans under the supervision of the Soviets. Inevitably, Marxist-Leninist ideology was an integral part of their training curriculum. Guerrillas were steeped in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and regarded it as the gospel truth. That pitted guerrillas against regulars. The former represented the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the East and yet the regulars from Mulungushi and Kohima represented the other side of the cold war, the West. Just how feasible was it to have the two diametrically opposed sides within the same movement?
On top of this, it is expedient to juxtapose the dimension of the nationalist leadership that flocked into Zambia following the death of JZ Moyo in 1977. The nationalists, wishing to assert themselves over the army, and following a 13-year absence (ten years in prison ) did not find Marxist-Leninist ideology palatable to them at all. Indeed, they never formally adopted and espoused it. For Nkomo, the PF (patriotic front) Zapu leader, the challenge was to remain loyal and favourably disposed to his faithfuls who stood firm behind him during the turbulent years when the nationalist movement faced a tumultuous period leading to the creation of Zanu-PF in 1963. Among these Nkomo loyalists in the National Executive Committee were men such as Vice-Chairman Josiah Mushore Chinamano, Amon Jirira, Willie Dzawanda Musarurwa, Joseph Msika, Sam Munodawafa and Naison Khutshwekhaya Ndlovu, inter alia.
At the same time, Nkomo had a knack for people who were his business associates, notably Tiny Roland of Lonrho. In March when he fled the country he was hosted by Roland in the United Kingdom. His position within this sort of complex matrix was, to say the least, unenviable. On the part of the Soviets, they were becoming wary of putting all their eggs in one basket. Zapu noticed that and were suspicious of the thawing of relations, probably getting the cue from the Soviets, between both Zanu and Ethiopia and Cuba. Zanu, on the other hand, had been unequivocal about their enunciation of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Leader, former President Robert Mugabe had even visited Angola and Cuba soliciting more support in order to get a share of the arms from the Soviets, if not directly, at least indirectly.
Within ZPRA, as alluded to above, contradictions were emerging. For example, there was the John Chironda-led rebellion when the group crossed the Zambezi River and travelled to Zimbabwe House to lodge their complaints. These men were a guerrilla-trained group. Somehow, the group was appeased and went back to Rhodesia. According to Dr Gordon Bango who I interviewed in 1999 at the Harare International Airport (15 March), indicated that the group formed the nucleus of the Tsholotsho group of ZPRA guerrillas who refused to get into assembly points when a ceasefire was declared before Christmas of 1979. A ZPRA contingent led by Mike Reynolds was dispatched to round them up.
Another disgruntled group of guerrillas also went to Lusaka at the time when Lancaster House Talks were in session. Sandlana Mafutha (Saul Sydney Dube) was in that group operating in the Lupane area. In some quarters they were seen as rebels but, in reality, that was indicative of things not going well within the movement.
Perhaps as we draw to the conclusion, let us deal, albeit cursorily with the Turning Point Strategy where the regular army was going to march on Rhodesia through Victoria Falls, Chirundu and Kariba. A brigade was already set to commence the march with support from the Engineering Corps, Motorised Division, and Mig 17(23) jet fighters for which technicians were being trained in some eastern province of the Soviet Union(Kirgizstan). Cubans were ready and willing to pilot the jets to provide air cover to the ground forces.
This is what one interviewee referred to as “iFeyafeya.” So much hope was pinned on this Zero Hour final stage of the Turning Point Strategy.
In fact, in the north, where after the October 1978 raids some Zapu/ ZPRA operations were based at Solwezi. One of these were the women’s military camp under the command of Gertrude Ngwenya. That military camp followed the bombardment of Mkushi east of Kabwe, formerly Broken Hill. There was a camp for the National Security and Order(NSO), and a military training camp for men. The schools for boys (JZ Moyo) and girls (Victory Camp) too had relocated there.
A second brigade for men was being assembled there and was going to receive some Angolan-trained and Ethiopian-trained cadres. The tanks too were awaited from Ethiopia. Some did get to Zimbabwe and one is displayed at the military museum in Gweru. Some of these were the tanks that were based at Esigodini (Essexvale then) and were on the move to reinforce their comrades at Entumbane in Bulawayo. The Mbhejelwa Moyo-led tanks were disabled former Rhodesian air force fire power.
Time did not allow a test for the joint march into Rhodesia as part of the Turning Point Strategy. I have argued elsewhere that Lancaster was convened precisely to thwart that plan which was well known, not only to Rhodesians, but also to Western allies. It was talks arranged as part of the cold war manoeuvres to checkmate Zapu and their sponsor, the Soviet Union. It is most unlikely that Western allies were going to stand by watch ZPRA march on Rhodesia. Western air surveillance was alert to the arrival of a large and powerful arsenal of weapons which were taken from Dar-es-Salaam to north-western Zambia. The weapons were finally kept in Ndola and only got to Zimbabwe before Entumbane I in 1980.
A biography of Dickson Netsha Sibanda which I did some years back indicated that it was Sibanda who bankrolled the transportation of the arms into Zimbabwe where, it is alleged, a government minister’s signature was forged to get the weapons through the customs formalities at the Victoria Falls Border Post.
The weapons were offloaded at the Gwayi River Mine Assembly Point, which was ZPRA’s largest where heavy weapons were kept in the bush around the cantonment. It may be prudent one day, to look at how the Patriotic Front (PF) was manipulated to cause a rift within the ranks of co-operating liberation movements. The objective was to ensure the PF became fractious so that it would not come back as one to fight the 1980 general elections. A united patriotic front would have averted even post independence political disturbances, a peaceful scenario that would not have been in the interests of the West then.
