The Political transitions and Economic Policy-making in Zimbabwe: 2008-2018

26 Jan, 2020 - 00:01 0 Views
The Political transitions and Economic Policy-making in Zimbabwe: 2008-2018

The Sunday News

Richard Mahomva

Voting for Transition

Election processes have been at the centre of Zimbabwean political transitions. The initial transfer of power which gave birth to Zimbabwe in 1980 was plebiscite facilitated. While elections serve as an urgent for democracy, it must be noted that elections legitimise processes of policy creation, consolidation and abortion (Moyo, 1992). This explains why the life cycle of elections has been mainly defined in terms of successive economic programmes of action. Office tenures emanating from electoral mandates give the direction and lifespan of economic policies. It is in election campaign messages where the agenda for economic development is framed (Simpser, 2013). In light of this reality, this week’s instalment discusses how elections in Zimbabwe between 2008 and 2018 have assisted in ushering political shifts whose legitimacy was couched on immediate economic roadmap prescriptions. The key submission here is that election campaigns market economic policy proposals. The second input of this submission is to explain (by means of empirical findings) that upon receiving election mandates, political parties consolidate their power and interests through economic policy-making (Simpser, 2013). To support this, evidence on the policy products of compromise during the Inclusive Government era is highlighted. Aspects of policy continuities and discontinuities are highlighted with a view to highlight the effects of political transitions on economic policy architecture. As such, Zanu-PF’s continued economic policy re-engineering between 2008 and 2018 can be situated in the recorded milestones of the land reform policy which was a precursor to the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act: 

“Fast track land redistribution undermined the underlying logic of settler-colonial agrarian relations founded on racial monopoly control over land that deprived peasants of land-based social reproduction and compelled cheap agrarian labour supplies. Redistribution reversed racial patterns of land ownership and broadened access to land across the ethnically diverse provinces, while replacing most private agricultural property rights with land user rights on public property.” (Moyo 2011, p 944a).

Further to this, there is need to question if economic policy-making has been ardently inclined on challenging white colonial monopoly power. This section also highlights the extent to which Zanu-PF has continued to be a beneficiary of electoral transitional dynamics in terms of economic policy construction. Samukele Hadebe, former Principal Director in the Office the Former Prime Minister of Zimbabwe (Morgan Tsvangirai) backs this assertion: 

“Zimbabwe earnestly began engagement with the West following the Inclusive Government from 2009, it kept the trade in diamonds and the returns outside the control of both Ministers of Finance, his Trade and Industry counterpart who were not from Zanu-PF. The reason being the issue of selective sanctions against Zanu-PF leaders. In a way, although Zimbabwe was opening up and had pressure of socio-economic decline, it still controlled how much it opened up, especially on the lucrative diamonds.”

This explains the popularity of the discourse of egalitarianism, and the politics of economic indigenisation and this section harnesses the underpinning logic of these two aspects which have aided the mainstreaming of economic policy creation. The role of the opposition is also assessed as an antithesis urgent for economic policies implemented by Zanu-PF. 

The Dynamics of the GNU Inclusivity and Reality of Transitional Compromises.

As a follow-up to the contested 2008 election outcome, a Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed in 2009. The GNU was comprised of Zanu-PF led by President Robert Mugabe and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) political parties, MDC-T led by Morgan Tsvangirai and MDC-M led by Arthur Mutambara (GoZ, 2018). A Negotiator of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) which conceived the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009 and Zanu-PF’s Politburo Secretary for Finance, Patrick Chinamasa submits that the political circumstances of the post-2008 election influenced power compromises which affected high-level decision-making in the Inclusive Government. It is argued that the GNU was a product of an election outcome which was: 

“. . . The harmonised elections had no outright winner for the country’s top post, leading to the holding of a run-off which failed the intended objective, as the other contestant withdrew, citing massive violence perpetrated by the ruling party Zanu-PF. The results did indicate that though Zanu-PF claimed the presidency on technical grounds, it was difficult to form a legitimate government to address the wishes of not only the majority of Zimbabweans but also of the large sections of international community.” (Guzura & Chigora, 2011 p 1)

Chinamasa states that the initial transitional dilemma to Zimbabwe’s economic policy structure was “the banning of the printing of the Zimbabwe Dollar by the Central Bank at the behest of the GNU appointed Finance Minister, Tendai Biti”. This resulted in the formalisation of a multi-currency system which never gave an opportunity for the local currency to trade or compete with other currencies. The Zanu-PF Secretary for Finance Patrick Chinamasa further posits that the economic policy implementation during that time was mainly hinged on “comprises since the GNU stripped Zanu-PF of political dominance” emanating from “the competitive and contested outcome of the 2008 election which fostered a GNU”. This indicates that the transitional compromises had a bearing on decision-making.  Chinamasa further argues that, “The state came under pressure and had to make landmark policy-changes. We had to make a lot of policy shifts to attend opposition mounting pressure and the influence of foreign forces to our politics.” Chigora & Guzura (2001 p 1) substantiates this position by indicating that the space for economic reform was intensely influenced by: 

“a hot political contestation dating back to the year 2000 with the entry onto the scene, of a new political party formed by civil society groups, challenging the once dominant political party that had brought Zimbabwe independence through the barrel of the gun. Since the year 2000, there has been deepening political and economic crisis which ultimately got into 2008, a year when the country held harmonised elections (these included electing leaders at the local council level, representatives to the house of assembly, the senate and the country’s top post).”

 This given position is illustrative of the effects of the political pressure effected by the outcome of the 2008 election and how Zanu-PF had to resort to compromise in terms of its policy positions. 

 Political Compromise and the Economic Architecture Polarisation 2008 – 2013

Patrick Chinamasa’s elaborate position on the currency reforms effected during Tendai Biti’s tenure as the Minister of Finance are a reflection of how political transitions affect economic policy architecture. In his view, there was a discontinuity to the monetary policy which feature the Zimbabwe Dollar in the competing basket of currencies. The same abandoned position of having the Zimbabwe Dollar being restored to usher a mono-currency system substantiates that the GNU grounding for compromise was the major reason why the Zimbabwe Dollar was ejected from the basket of currencies until Zanu-PF had gained better political ground after the 2013 election. 

It is on this premise that the Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) was launched in March 2009 and was to be effected as a transitional compromise GNU economic policy (GoZ, 2009). STERP co-existed with the Zanu-PF originated Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy (IEEP).  Tendai Biti, the then GNU Finance Minister lobbied less for the latter as its formation serviced the direct power consolidation interests of Zanu-PF. This view in highlighted in his 2009 Budget Statement when he emphasised that: 

“The Inclusive Government is founded on certain values that are at the core and epicentre of STERP. The preamble to the GPA acknowledges that ‘the values of justice, fairness, openness, tolerance, equality, non-discrimination and respect of all persons without regard to race, class, gender, ethnicity, language, religion, political opinion, place of origin or birth are the bedrock of our democracy and good governance’. In addition, the GPA itself has a vision of the new Zimbabwean society that is ‘free of violence, fear, intimidation, hatred, patronage, corruption and founded on justice, fairness, openness, transparency, dignity and equality’ STERP is loyal to the above aspirations and values, which are essential and critical to get Zimbabwe moving again. In this regard, the issue of corruption and combating corruption particularly in the public service is vital to the enforcement of the above values.” (GoZ 2009 p 17-19)

The prima facie predominant strategic objective of STERP was to restore economic growth against a backdrop of a protracted economic crisis which had confronted Zimbabwe after the land-reform programme. Sampson & Hawkins (2018 p227): 

“The overarching strategic objective of this multi-sectoral programme was that of restoring economic growth. This was to be done by freeing up markets and prices, increasing levels of savings and investment, and which together with the exercise of strong fiscal discipline and improved revenue collection would strengthen government’s revenue base. This, in turn, would allow Government to rebuild the country’s dilapidated infrastructure and restart basic service delivery.”

The objectives of STERP seem to clandestinely echo the longstanding political reforms driven by the opposition since its inception in 1999. The same reform values have also been exported into the opposition’s list for electoral reforms in Zimbabwe. It can be argued that STERP as a blueprint born out of political compromise had nuances of breaking the monopoly and hegemony of the ruling Zanu-PF. This is largely because Zanu-PF was a beneficiary of “populist” policies since the land-reform era (Muzondidya 2004; 2007). In contesting the race essentialist underpinning characteristic of the economic indigenisation agenda pushed by Zanu-PF, STERP advocated for market liberalisation, enhancement Foreign Direct Investment facilitation. STERP also called for the exercise of strong fiscal discipline and improved revenue collection to strengthen Government’s revenue base. The notion of fiscal discipline and consolidation could have been probed by the opposition GNU actors’ fear of state-party conflation which sustained Zanu-PF’s power-base. On the other hand, Zanu-PF consolidated its political capital through the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy (IEEP). The indigenisation framework was an outgrowth of The “Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act’ (GoZ, 2008). The Act was passed into law by the Zanu-PF majority in Parliament prior to the 2008 elections. 

Share This:

Survey


We value your opinion! Take a moment to complete our survey

This will close in 20 seconds