The Sunday News
Pathisa Nyathi
LANCASTER House talks came about following ramping of the war of liberation by the two liberation movements, ZPRA and Zanla. Later, effects of the war began to manifest themselves in other forms that were beginning to take a toll in other social and economic spheres.
Handlers of Rhodesians began to see their own interests being jeopardised and calculated that a round table conference was their only hope for survival in a world where they competed against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
In an earlier article we referred to one of the factors behind softening of white opinion in Rhodesia as adoption by Zapu/ ZPRA of the Turning Point Strategy with its Zero Hour component. As pointed out in the last instalment, in 1976, Commander-in-Chief of ZPRA, Jaison Ziyaphapha Moyo took a decision to transform the guerrilla warfare to a conventional or regular one. That came about as a result of acknowledged superiority of the Rhodesian Security Forces when it came to a conventional warfare where they made use of their aerial superiority. In order to end the protracted war of liberation, it became imperative to match the Rhodesians and beat them at their own game by seizing state power.
By 1977 the Rhodesians were quietly beginning to acknowledge that they could not win the war. They were fighting a losing war. It was acknowledged then, that a political solution was the only viable option to bring the war to an end. By November 1978 ZPRA commanders, particularly those in the intelligence wing were confident that the Turning Point Strategy had been sufficiently developed to a level where the Zero Hour component could be launched with the proposed date set for end of 1979.
Many aspects of the Turning Point Strategy had been taken care of from arming ZPRA with heavy weapons such as Strella missiles and building of conventional aspects of a war. ZPRA had tremendously extended its striking capability. Their focus on seizing state power was not in the interests of the western powers who were following closely all the developments, in particular the role of the Soviet Union in equipping ZPRA and providing them with military consultancy at various levels.
While acknowledging that the war could not be won, they did not entertain the prospects of the Patriotic Front getting into power in Zimbabwe. The idea of majority rule was beginning to dawn in their minds, but to them it was an idea that excluded the Patriotic Front. A conference was held in 1976 at Geneva in that year in search of a way of resolving the Rhodesian constitutional impasse.
By 1977 measures were being taken to engage some black political leaders within Rhodesia in order to come up with some soft-landing political arrangement that would end the war and restore an economy that was tottering on the verge of collapse. Within Rhodesia then, there were a number of black-led political parties that were identified and enticed to engage the Ian Smith regime. Bishop Abel Muzorewa who had been thrust into the political arena during the time when Zapu and Zanu leaders were in detention at the time of the Pearce Commission, was the main player in the political game. He led the United African National Council (UANC), while Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, ejected from Zanu, led another internal political formation.
In addition to these two, there were chiefs Jeremiah Chirau who led the Zimbabwe United People’s Organisation (Zupo). Later Chief Khayisa Ndiweni broke away from Zupo and formed his own political party that fought in the 1980 general elections. Both James Chikerema and George Nyandoro were also part of the internal black political leadership in front of whose eyes and mouths the carrot was being dangled. The Smith regime pinned its hopes on reaching some sort of internal settlement with these leaders to the exclusion of the Patriotic Front co-led by the late nationalists Joshua Nkomo of Zapu and Robert Gabriel Mugabe of Zanu.
On 3 March 1978, an Internal Settlement was hammered out and ushered into government black ministers. It was an interim political arrangement while the general elections were awaited in April 1979. Indeed, the elections were held in which Bishop Abel Muzorewa emerged victorious and formed a government that was to be short-lived. It existed from April 1979 and by December of the same year Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, as the country was known then, had reverted to a British colony flying the Union Jack with Lord Soames in Salisbury (now Harare) representing the British crown.
The international community realised that any deal that excluded the Patriotic Front was a sham arrangement and not likely to hold. The Bishop Muzorewa government failed to get the much-needed international recognition which, it was expected, would bring to an end the sanctions imposed on the pariah state. Even the Western countries realised that and so there was the desire to find a lasting and sustainable solution that was going to receive international recognition and bring the war to an end. The Rhodesian economy had severely been battered.
Some of the effects of the war were visible. The two civilian viscounts had been downed with SAM 7 missiles in 1978 and 1979. Another civilian aircraft arrived at the Salisbury International Airport with holes in its body. The rail line from Salisbury to Umtali (now Mutare) had been damaged. Most vivid were fuel tanks in Salisbury that were destroyed and sent huge flames reaching to and lapping the high heavens.
Morale was low and there were many whites who had voted with their feet. Many were not convinced that the war was justified in terms of economic ruin in its wake. The costs in human lives were high. Army reservists had been activated, so were the women. Call-ups were initiated and extended to the black community. Where possible, call-up was evaded. Liberated or semi-liberated zones had been created. The Rhodesian Security Forces were no longer able to get to certain areas, either on foot or by vehicles.
Ceasefire was agreed upon. There was no choice as Front Line State leaders were also under pressure to see a solution reached as their countries were at the receiving end. Though they wanted fellow Africans to win the war, their territories, notably Mozambique and Zambia suffered cross border raids which impacted negatively on their economies. The Zambian border with Rhodesia had been closed for a while and Zambia was bringing imports through the TAZARA rail line linking Lusaka and Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania.
The significance of the ceasefire lay mostly in having thwarted Zapu/ZPRA’s Turning Point Strategy which, if it was given a chance and succeeded, would have enhanced the chances of the Soviet Union establishing a strong foothold in Southern Africa. An outright military victory would have worked against western interests. That was not to be. A strategy crafted way back in 1974, in the name of détente, was relentlessly pursued and finally, it paid dividends through checkmating both PF-Zapu/ZPRA and the Soviets.
Quite clearly, the ceasefire was, to some people, a sell-out constitutional arrangement calculated to bring to an end what they had been anticipating all those long years of the armed struggle — to march through the streets triumphantly. It was time to move to assembly points, as admission to a constitutional arrangement. There was disgruntlement among guerrillas who once they were housed within assembly points, were given differential payments calculated on the basis of their ranks. The ranks ranged from equivalents of Private, Corporal, Platoon Commander, Company Commander, Detachment Commander and Camp Commander.
In quite several assembly points there were flare-ups fuelled by different levels within the payouts issue. At the St Paul’s Assembly Point the simmering tensions ended up with a hand grenade being thrown into the office of Gedi Dube who was ZPRA’s Political Commissar. He was injured in the incident. It took the leader of PF-Zapu, Joshua Nkomo to quell the tension at St Paul’s Assembly Point:
Hi..i, ZPRA Forces!
Selisilwa, libang’ imali,
(You are fighting over money,)
Ngathi ngisiyalidingela intonga lezo,
(When I went to get you those weapons,)
Ngathi ngezokuthi lidubulane?
(Did I say you were going to use them to kill each other?)
Liyakwazi lapho engazithatha khona?
(Do you know where I got them?)
Liyazazi inyosi?
(Do you know bees?)
Yebo, siyazazi,
(Yes, we do).
Liyalizibone lapho okugeziselwa khona imiganu ngomama?
(Have you ever seen them where women wash their plates?)
Kulenye ethiwa libhungayezi,
(There is one called a drone,)
Iyabe isele emlindini ezinye zisiyasela,
(It remains behind in the hive when others go out to obtain food.)
Ledlulwa yizibungu?
(Are you not better than insects?)
A full rendition of Nkomo’s address to guerrillas at St Paul’s Assembly Point is given in a forthcoming biography of a ZPRA cadre due for publication before end of month.
