The Sunday News
Rtd Brig-Gen Abel Mazinyane
MILITARY training was the most challenging task a cadre could face during the armed struggle. The military training challenge tested one’s dedication to the liberation of Zimbabwe.
Both liberation Armies of Zimbabwean (ZPRA and ZANLA) made military training an unforgettable chapter in one’s life. My stay with ZANLA in Mozambique under ZIPA demonstrated that military training was given the priority it deserved by both armies.
Military training under the ZPRA syllabus lasted six to nine months. Others left training earlier for various reasons. One of the reasons was that some cadres had to sometimes leave before a passout (a ceremony to officially end training) to attend specialist courses abroad eg training in the USSR, other Eastern European countries and some African countries if the need arose. During training, a ZPRA trainee at a ZPRA training camp covered the following subjects; physical training, weapon handling and marksmanship, topography, military tactics, military engineering, politics, military security, first aid and military drill. One aspect of training that was highly emphasised was night fighting. Night fighting enabled a small ZPRA force to pin down the highly trained and equipped Rhodesian Army. Its air superiority was rendered infective by ZPRA night fighting capabilities.
Some people have always wondered why in photos ZPRA soldiers are seen operating their weapons blind folded. This was to prepare them for working in total darkness, night fighting. One interesting subject in ZPRA training was GWA. GWA stood for Guerrilla Warfare Administration. This subject was of great interest to trainers, because it was the survival kit of a guerrilla in operations. It covered the storage of water, food, medicine, clothing, weapons and ammunitions. This was a speciality of the logistics department.
The ZPRA logistics department perfected this subject during operations. Unfortunately at the time when Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko was chief of logistics there were hardly any weapons for storage. However, this man was already a veteran of GWA during Wankie and Spolilo operations. He spent most this period sourcing for weapons. By this time GWA was mostly confined to storage of landmines and ammunitions. When I first crossed into Rhodesia from Zambia I used Cde Lemmy’s AK. My weapon was an old RPD light machine gun that had a partly burnt butt used as a base defence weapon. I crossed into Rhodesia with only 90 rounds of ammunition.
I was shocked when I read in the newspapers that VP Mphoko had diverted ZPRA weapons, anti-air weapons to be specific. Unfortunately the wild accusation defeats logic because our instructors in Morogoro/Tanzania had to use one rifle for the training of some cadres, because weapons were highly controlled by the liberation centre in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Zambia, the liberation centre in Lusaka and the Zambian Army. Sometimes ZPRA deployment was influenced by scarcity of weapons. There are periods when some comrades were with WW2 single shot rifles. The liberation movement weapon control jargon went as follows; weapons donated to liberation movements, ZAPU in particular, were sent to Dar es Salaam Tanzania. The weapons were received by the Tanzanian government which then handed them to the Liberation Committee which also informed the Zambian government which would send its army to transport them to Zambia. In Zambia the weapons were handed to the Liberation Centre in Lusaka.
The liberation Centre informed ZPRA command and transported the weapons to ZPRA storage in the presence of a Zambian army officer, a senior ZPRA commander and a senior ZPRA logistics officer. Removal of weapons from any storage involved the logistic department representative, a local logistic commander and a local field commander. From here weapons were issued to individual guerrillas by a logistics commander on a requisition by the unity commander that followed the channel of command. Under normal circumstances a ZPRA guerrilla was issued with one personal weapon except when he/she is a commander.
This did not include urban units or other special operations units. Anyone who lost his/her weapon had to satisfy the command through an interview before he could be given another weapon. Those who returned to Zambia without their weapons after hiding their weapons in Rhodesia for one reason or another were given one grenade and joined a unit that was to pass through where their weapon was left. It was a nasty experience, however, it encouraged comrades not to lose their weapons. Those who lost their weapons to the enemy lived in the hope of capturing one from the enemy. It was impossible to divert ammunition from ZPRA armoury let alone artillery pieces for that matter. The accusation is either a demonstration of ignorance of the accuser on ZPRA operational procedures or mere mischief.
Artillery was established as department of ZPRA in 1977. All artillery weapons came to Zambia and ZPRA when VP Mphoko was no longer chief of logistics. The chief of logistics was now Sam Mfakazi, deputised by, Masala Sibanda, Donki, Nyawera and Petros Khumalo (Pondo). Cde Mphoko did not have a deputy when he was ZPRA chief of logistics, except in ZIPA where he was deputised by Comrade Kagure who was from ZANLA. The other time he had a deputy was when the ZAPU armed wing was called “Special Affairs”.
The artillery department had Andrew Ndlovu (Dumezweni) as its chief at its formation. This was after the Soviet Union had trained a contingent of artillery men in 1977. A small group had been trained in 1974/75 also in the Soviet Union, but this group was absorbed by our training establishments as instructors. At formation the artillery department was immediately removed from ZPRA to the president’s office together with the medical department. However, the medical department was later resurrected with its chief as a deputy chief of logistics responsible for medicine.
Procurement and storage of all logistics was later a responsibility of the newly created National Logistics a department of the party. All departments had to send their requests to National Logistics. ZPRA also had to request armament from national logistics.
Anti-air weapons came into the ZPRA arsenal in 1977 when VP Mphoko had left for Maputo as ZAPU representative. Sam Mfakazi was now the chief of logistics. The moving of artillery from ZPRA to the president’s office was not well received by the High Command. Despite the strong argument we put forward against the move, the party was not convinced. The party was supreme. It should also be understood that liberation movements had very sophisticated weaponry.
The Zambezi escarpment was unavoidable terrain when crossing the Zambezi from Zambia into Rhodesia. The route through Wankie Game Park had its own challenges. The Rhodesian army wanted to make the escarpment a killing zone. At the beginning of the conflict the Rhodesian army wanted to use the Zambezi or natural obstacle against the guerrillas crossing into Rhodesia. However, ZPRAs had tamed the Zambezi and the Rhodesians lost superiority. In the escarpment at first the guerrillas had an advantage because their small units could easily move along the narrow lanes of the escarpment while the Rhodesian army found it difficult to manoeuvre their large units in the narrow lanes. The narrow lanes of the Zambezi gorges made command and control difficult. The Rhodesians were fast learners. They immediately developed a fire force concept. This tactical concept was a deployment of a small mobile force air delivered to the battlefield to engage guerrillas. This tactic enabled the Rhodesians to engage ZPRA forces with fresh and rested troops.
To counter this, ZPRA polished its physical fitness training. Endurance capability of a ZPRA guerrilla had to be upped a notch to be a step ahead of the Rhodesian soldier. One of the training counter measures introduced by ZPRA was a short march. Short march as the name suggests, was a short march [3km] except that within it there was crawling, rolling monkey crawling and all activities carried out in a mock battle. One had to be physically fit to survive the gruelling march.
Those who passed out during this exercise would sometimes be resuscitated by pilling some grass on them and lighting it. The results were better than pouring cold water. Forces trained outside ZPRA training syllabus where whenever possible taken through acclimatisation programme before deployment. Other elements of physical training were judo and obstacle crossing. All praise should go to the former ZPRA department of training for producing such a formidable fighter for our liberation struggle.
- Rtd Brig-Gen Mazinyane is a former member of the Zipra high command.
