The Sunday News
Today marks the end of our interview with former Zipra deputy frontal commander for the Northern Front Cde Nicholas Gibson Nkomo pseudo name Gilbert Khumalo. In the two previous installments of the interview, Cde Nkomo spoke about the battles that took place in the mid-70s and how the freedom fighters used to cross the Zambezi River from Zambia to hit selected targets in the then Rhodesia. Such incursions saw the Rhodesians making follow-ups into Zambia resulting in fierce battles. Last week our article ended when Cde Nkomo gave us an account on how he and his unit laid an ambush that stretched from Cross Mabale and Lukosi River along the Bulawayo-Victoria Falls Road to avenge the death of seven comrades killed in a contact with the enemy forces in the Hwange area. The ambush was meant to give an impression to the enemy that a big unit of guerillas had been deployed in the area while in an actual fact Cde Nkomo had only 17 soldiers. Today Cde Nkomo picks up the conversation by relating to us what happened after that incident. Read on….
MS: So despite the use of helicopters the Rhodesian forces failed to detect you and what happened after that?
Cde Nkomo: The enemy deployed two helicopters, one patrolled along the Bulawayo-Victoria Falls Road while the other came from behind us, I mean myself and my group that was at Lukosi Bridge but they failed to spot us. As I said before our ambush stretched from Cross Mabale up to Lukosi Bridge near St Mary’s. In between there were two comrades at each selected spot. The one that was at Lambo Bridge is the one that killed the Rhodesian army officer I mentioned before. We had chosen our GP (gathering point) to be at the mountains near Lukosi River, so that is where we met after our successful mission. We were 17 this time as we had lost one comrade who was quickly buried by Donga and his unit.
MS: What was the message at the GP?
Cde Nkomo: I congratulated my boys for a job well done and also expressed regret at the loss of one of us. I then told them that on the following day I was leaving for Zambia to give a report about what happened to the nine comrades whom we had come to that area in search of them. It was at that time that I told my boys that I was leaving 13 to continue with the operations in the area while I take three with me back to Zambia. From the 16 I chose Donga who was later on to become the regional security man, Gordon Tshuma and Gordon Shumba to give me escort back to Zambia. However, when we reached the Zambezi Escarpment we spent a day in hiding because of the heavy presence of the Rhodesian forces who had intensified their border patrols because of what we had done to them along the Victoria Falls Road. They had air support as helicopters were also hovering around. We eventually managed to cross and reached the headquarters where I presented my report to Cde Enoch Tshangane (late Retired Major-General Jevan Maseko) who was the Chief of Operations at that time. I also discovered that the two of the nine who had survived in Hwange had reached Zambia and told their story.
MS: After that what did you do in Zambia. Were you given another task?
Cde Nkomo: I was always on the field directing operations. To answer your question, yes, I was given another job to do. This time I was given orders to deploy troops at the front and immediately after my arrival at the rear I was given 200 guerillas to take to the front. That was around April 1977 and it was not an easy task because as you know the first enemy of Zipra forces throughout the armed struggle faced was the Zambezi River. Taking such a large number of troops needed a lot of tact and ingenuity because the Rhodesian forces were always patrolling along the river and also deployed their troops at the crossing points. Because of the size of the river we were using the same crossing points that were used by the guerillas of the 60s such as Moffat Hadebe. There was no way we could have changed because we had to cross at a point where the Zambezi is narrow. However, I managed to take the 200 guerillas across the Zambezi and sent them to different operational areas. As an organisation we had also acquired modern dinghies at that time which could carry 24 soldiers at a time compared to the ones used in earlier days which could carry a few.
MS: So you managed to deploy the 200 what happened after that?
Cde Nkomo: What you should be aware of is that before the coming in large of groups there were few guerillas that were operating in the country. When those nine guys were hit in Hwange, there were few on that ground. However, when I returned to Zambia after the Bulawayo-Victoria Falls Road incident some guerillas were being deployed in the country and one such group was the one that had the likes of Mafutha (Saul Sydney Dube) and Castro who started operating in Binga and Lupane. Before that a number of guerillas were based across the Zambezi only making incursions like what I said before. The deployments of large groups changed the situation on the ground and the Rhodesian army started feeling the heat.
MS: Where were those groups coming from, I mean the training camps.
Cde Nkomo: Some had trained at Morogoro in Tanzania while others were being trained in Mwembeshi in Zambia. Later more soldiers were being trained in Angola where the first group that went there in 1977 had about 2 000 recruits. Our forces were also receiving training in other countries as well such as Cuba, Libya and the Soviet Union. At that point to some of us it was matter of time before we won the war.
MS: When deploying the troops what were they supposed to do when they got into contact with the masses?
Cde Nkomo: There were supposed to get into contact with the underground operation groups of the party, Zapu. Where the party structures were not all that strong they were supposed to mobilise and reactivate them. Among the guerillas there were commissars who were supposed to do that job. However, the guerillas strictly relied on party structures.
MS: So you continued with the operations at the front.
Cde Nkomo: Yes, and at the beginning of 1978 we had many troops on the ground. We were all over but I lost two of powerful commanders at the Mabale turn-off, Twinlock Nkomo and Fisher when a group of Selous Scouts using their tricks of pretending to be guerillas hit them. What happened was that those Selous Scouts spread the word to villagers that they were guerillas who had just arrived from Zambia and wanted to meet their “colleagues” who were operating in the area. Twinlock and Fisher fell for the trap and went to meet them and were killed in that process. Those boys were good fighters but as it happens in any war situation if you make a mistake the result can be fatal. In a bid to rub salt to our wounds the Selous Scouts went on to display the bodies of the two at a community well where the whole village was drawing its water from. Their bodies were hanged on a tree at that well. After being on the field I was recalled to the Zipra Headquarters in Lusaka but on my way took 30 recruits and crossed with them to Botswana.
MS: What happened when you got to Lusaka?
Cde Nkomo: It was during the time when operational fronts were being redrawn coming up with the two fronts, the northern and the southern each with three regions. In fact when I was recalled to Lusaka I was to be given a new rank, so I was promoted to the rank of deputy frontal commander of the northern front deputising Cde Rodwell Nyika (Retired Brigadier-General Collin Moyo). The new arrangement was also to see senior commanders moving into operational areas. So as the deputy frontal commander I was also to move into our operational zones. However, my immediate commander Rodwell Nyika was to continue based at the HQ coming to the front when a need arose. However, Rodwell also went to assess the situation at the front and at times got into combat as well. He is the one who commanded our unit that attacked the Mana Pools Camp along the Zambezi River. During that attack the camp was completely destroyed never to be used again. The Rhodesian forces suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of Rodwell and his unit. Our guys used heavy weapons to destroy that camp.
MS: You then moved to the front in your new role and where did you go?
Cde Nkomo: Indeed I moved to the front but our front was large as it stretched from the Botswana border in Bulilima right up to Nyamapanda Border Post divided into three regions, the Northern Front 1 (NF1) which covered districts such as Tsholotsho, Bulilima and Hwange. Other areas in our operational areas were Lupane, Nkayi, Binga, Kamativi, Gokwe, Silobela and other parts of Midlands while NF3 covered Mashonaland West with areas such as Mhangura, Chinhoyi, Karoi, Hurungwe, Kariba and so on. Parts of Mashonaland Central such as Guruve were part of NF3. When I got to the front I established my headquarters in Gwampa Valley area near Lake Alice which is in Lupane. I then started re-organising and energising the command structure.
MS: Can you please give us a breakdown of your command element?
Cde Nkomo: Since I was based in the Gwampa Valley I was closer to NF1 and NF2 and our command element was as follows: NF1 was under the command of Cde John Nyamupingidza (Retired Colonel Watson Tshipa) while the regional commander for areas such as Lupane, Nkayi and the rest of Matabeleland North was Cde Jerry Mthethwa, for areas covering Midlands they were under the command of Phebion Mutero while up north covering places like Hurungwe, Mhangura, Karoi etc there was Cde Richard Mataure (Retired Colonel Richard Ngwenya. In the Southern Front there was a similar arrangement but I cannot speak for them as there were commanders there some of them still alive. Under the regional commanders there were zone commanders going down to section commanders. What I should point out is that as more troops continued pouring into the operational areas the units were now having attachments such as military engineers, intelligence officers from National Security Organisation (NSO) and troops trained in the use of anti-air weapons. It was now a complete army.
MS: I suppose this was part of the Turning Point.
Cde Nkomo: True. We were now operating in big numbers to lay the ground for the Zero Hour. At that time we were aiming for bigger targets as we laid the ground for regular forces. In fact reconnaissance teams from the regular forces had started coming into the operational areas to assess the situation.
MS: How secure were you as the commander on the ground directing operations from your headquarters in the Gwampa Valley Forest.
Cde Nkomo: I was very secure because at that time Lupane and surrounding areas had become a no-go area for the Rhodesian forces. Anyway we were also prepared for anything. The type of weapons that we had could handle any situation. We had units armed with Surface to Air Missiles, ama Straller (SAM ), B-10 and other heavy weapons, so the situation had changed completely. Other senior commanders such as Cde David Thodlana (late Tshaka Moyo) had also moved deep into the operational areas and was roaming around the Nkayi area. Cde Thodlana was in the intelligence working under NSO and was our Chief of Intelligence for the operational zone. However, the frontal intelligence officer was Cde Madayiza Moyo. He is employed by the State at the moment.
MS: I understand there was a time when you created detachments. Tell us more about that.
Cde Nkomo: The creation of detachments to enable our troops to operate in big numbers was part of the Turning Point where we envisaged an outright military victory. Personally I formed six detachments each with about 200 troops and they were the following, Spear under the command of Cde Stalin covered the Lupane area, Striker with Cde Dwala Nkomo as one of the commanders was in Nkayi, Vulindlela operating in areas such as Lower Gweru, Silobela, Zhombe and other parts of Midlands was commanded by Cde Christopher Fuyane who I am told is still serving in the army and his real name is Mbonisi Gatsheni, the fourth detachment was the Madiliza and this one moved closer to Bulawayo as it was operating in the Inyathi area and it was commanded by Cde Jack Hlongwane, the fifth was the Pamozi which operated in the Mzola, Dandanda, Kana in Lupane and Binga under the command of Cde Driver. That detachment had the likes of Mafutha and Andrew Ndlovu while the sixth detachment, the Parirenyatwa was based in Gokwe.
MS: Then came the declaration of the ceasefire where did you go?
Cde Nkomo: I moved into St Paul’s Assembly Point but before we went there I had a very disturbing experience where five of my soldiers openly told me that although they accepted and respected what the political leadership had done at Lancaster they were not comfortable with working with the Rhodesians. They told me that they were never going to work with people like General Oakland who was part of the ceasefire monitoring team, soldiers from New Zealand and the Rhodesians, saying they were reactionaries who had suppressed revolutions in many parts of the world such as in Malaya. Those boys removed their combat gear, surrendered their weapons and wished me and other colleagues good luck. They did not trust the new dispensation as they felt moving into APs was a trap by the Rhodesians. I never saw them again. However, we moved into St Paul’s where the commander was Gedi Ndlovu (late Retired Colonel Richard Dube). Gedi was there for sometime and left. I then took over as commander of St Paul’s. After that I was appointed commander of Entumbane when guerillas started moving into urban areas. At Entumbane I went there following the death of Cde Makhosi Masese who was died in a car accident.
MS: Entumbane. Tell us more about Entumbane.
Cde Nkomo: We had unfortunate incidents there between Zipra and Zanla. The main cause of that being the presence of the Rhodesian forces who were camped at what is now Gibixhegu Beer Garden near our camps. However, I am glad that as commanders we worked around the problem. In December 1980 after the first incident in October I spoke to my Zanla counterpart and convinced him that we hold a joint Christmas party in a bid to get rid of suspicious among us the nationalist forces and indeed we did that. What happened was that we as the command element of Zipra we went to the Zanla side and had drinks and everything went well. We then moved the party to the Zipra side and there was merry making as well. We had a nice day. That settled down our troops.
MS: I understand you served in the army and left . What are you doing now.
Cde Nkomo: I am into politics serving as a member of the Zanu-PF Central Committee. I have held other positions in Zanu-PF such as Matobo DCC commissar, Matabeleland South Provincial Commissar, the council chairperson for the Matobo Rural District Council. In 2008 I ran on a Zanu-PF ticket but lost to Gabriel Ndebele of MDC-T. However, we went back to the drawing board and in 2013 recaptured the seat as Zanu-PF with our candidate Cde Soul Mahalima Ncube winning it. I enjoy working with the people at grass roots level. It gives me a lot of satisfaction.
MS: In closing this interview what message do you have to the people as you are one of the senior commanders of the liberation. Your history says so and no one can take that away from you.
Cde Nkomo: My message is simple but crucial. The enemy that fought and defeated in the battle front is lurking around and has not given up, so as Zimbabweans we should remain united despite our different cultural backgrounds and geographical situations. There is beauty in our diversity.
We should hold on to the ideals of the late Vice-President Dr Joshua Nkomo and President Mugabe. Our strength lies in our unity. We should guard jealously this Zimbabwe.
