The Sunday News
Michael Mhlanga
According to the 2010-2011 nationwide Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) conducted by the government statistic agency, 84,5 percent of the population is Christian, 13 percent reports no religious affiliation, 2 percent adheres uniquely to traditional beliefs, and less than 1 percent is Muslim. According to the DHS, of the total population, 33,5 percent is Apostolic, 18 percent Pentecostal, 15,5 percent other Protestant, 9 percent Roman Catholic, and 8 percent other Christian.
This phenomenon has produced numerous new studies and sub-fields of research, as well as broader understandings of what religion means and how it functions in “world-making” and in political life. Obviously, this surge is characteristic not only of Africa and African Studies — it is a global phenomenon. But one could claim that discussions on religion, politics and the “public sphere”, and by implication of the “secular state model”, now make Africa, which is marked by vibrant religious life, a prime case for the comparative study of the relationship between politics and religion.
The stakes of religious coexistence have changed radically in post-colonial African states as the new discourses of democratisation and development gradually displace the structures of autocratic and customary rule. Mainstream religious organisations that have long enjoyed the patrimony of colonial and post-independence governments now find themselves threatened by newer religious formations. The latter are dominated by revivalist Christian and Muslim groups. With democratisation and globalisation have come new forms of religious competitiveness and militancy (notably among the youth). The growth of mass-mediated forms of religious expression has opened up new possibilities for religious communication and conversion, providing increased visibility and audibility for minority religious groups. In the case of South Africa, for example, the management of religious pluralism has been integrated with the goals of the new democratic state.
In contrast, Zimbabwe has experienced rising tensions in inter-religious relations in the last two decades, with considerable loss of life and property damage. These can be attributed to the broader challenges of political instability, corruption, and economic hardship.
Coinciding with the upsurge in religious revivalism in many parts of Africa is the growth of a human rights culture. Rights talk is now heard from the highest levels of government to the humblest non-governmental organisations. At its launch in 2000, the new African Union proclaimed the centrality of human rights. Religious and community leaders claim these rights in the new spirit of communal self-determination, constitutionalism, and international human rights awareness. Almost every African state has included a bill of rights in its constitution. Religious freedom features prominently in one form or another in those constitutions.
In his useful analysis of this topic, South African legal scholar Johan van der Vyver discovers common standards regarding religious freedom in African constitutions, but also great variety in terms of limitation contingencies. Many Anglophone countries in Africa follow the religious freedom directives of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which provides: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.” They also follow closely the limitation criteria stipulated in the European Convention.
However, van der Vyver notes the difference between Senegal, for example, which simply subjects the free exercise of religion to the demands of the public order (Article 19), and Sudan, which is committed to upholding standards of morality, public order, and health as “required by law,” in preference to the free exercise of religion (Article 18). Niger has added to the requirement of public order considerations of social tranquillity and national unity (Article 24). Togo requires the practice of religious beliefs to be conducted with respect for the liberties of others, the maintenance of public order, standards established by laws and regulations, and respect for the secularity of the state (Article 25).
In Namibia, the right to enjoy, practice, profess, maintain, and promote any religion must be exercised within the terms of the constitution, and subject to the further condition that the right does not impinge on the rights of others or the national interest (Article 19). Not jeopardising the rights of others or the common good is a limitation in Cape Verde (Article 48), and the Republic of Congo similarly protects “public order and morals” (Article 17). Rwanda limits the free exercise of religion only in cases where punishment is imposed for infractions committed in the public exercise of that freedom (Article 18).
The Dialectics of Regulation and Recognition of Religious Freedom
Patterns of strict regulation of religious groups can sometimes be traced back to colonial practices or the manipulation of the status of religious groups according to the political needs of the post-colonial ruler. In former Zaire, the colonial government set in motion national and provincial mechanisms in 1938 for disbanding “sectes” and “associations indigenes,” which were considered to be a threat to public order.
In his extensive efforts to construct an ideologically integrated Zairean state from 1965 onwards, the head of state, Mobutu Sese Seko, launched various laws to restrict the activities of religious groups. The new law of December 31, 1971, regulated public worship and the conditions for recognition as a legal religious institution in Zaire. The effect of the law was to break down the historic monopoly of the Roman Catholic Church as a partner of the state according to the agreement that had been reached between King Leopold II and Rome in 1906. The new law granted legal status to three established churches and ignored the Islamic community.
Down south, the debate gained momentum in 2015 with the Commission known as the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (CPPRCRLM) announced it will investigate the financial affairs of churches, mosques, synagogues and other houses of religion and spirituality. The investigation was aimed at formulating “sweeping regulations” of religious institutions to protect individuals against money-making charlatans. It is, however, unclear whether such regulation aimed at protecting believers would be constitutionally valid. After the “Elliot” Saga at Alleluya Ministries, Freedom of Religion South Africa (FOR SA) reported on the CRL Rights Commission’s current investigation into the “commercialisation” of religion and abuse of people’s belief systems, and the subpoenas issued to various religious leaders (including the leaders of prominent churches) to appear before the Commission.
While we (FOR SA) share the Commission’s concerns about unscrupulous pastors who abuse their positions to manipulate the poor out of money for selfish gain, we are concerned that the scope of the investigation is overbroad and touches on matters of religious doctrine which are protected from State interference. In similar vein, we are concerned that the Commission’s proposed solution to the problem, namely “self-regulation” of religion (including the Church), is not a workable or constitutionally permissible solution.
No interference in doctrine
As a starting point, it is important to recognise that the Constitution guarantees religious freedom and that the Constitutional Court (in Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope, 2002) has already found that people should be free to believe, teach and preach, and practise their beliefs without interference or punishment by the State, no matter how “bizarre, illogical or irrational” those beliefs may seem. Doctrine (being a belief or set of beliefs) is therefore protected by the Constitution and, as a matter of principle, is immune from interference or restriction by the State or by anyone else — unless there is a constitutionally acceptable purpose for the interference or restriction.
