The Sunday News
The act of reconnoitering to gain information about an enemy or potential enemy is a cornerstone of any military operation in a war situation. Reconnaissance officers are by nature responsible for analysing intelligence, planning, and tactical employment of ground surveillance.
During the armed struggle the country’s liberation armies, Zipra and Zanla had their own reconnaissance officers who played a vital role in the execution of their operations. In our today’s Lest We Forget column our Assistant Editor Mkhululi Sibanda (MS) spoke to one of the Zipra’s reconnaissance officers, Cde Rabson Ncube whose pseudo name was Cde Chunkie Moyo.
Cde Ncube because of the nature of his duties was given dangerous missions in MashonaIand West and Central Provinces which also saw him at some point deployed deep inside Salisbury now Harare to carry out reconnaissance missions. Cde Ncube was born on 4 July 1953 at Sotshe in Silobini area of Umzingwane District, Matabeleland South.
He joined the armed struggle in January 1976 in Zambia via Botswana. After undergoing military training at CGT1 in Zambia, he was immediately sent for further training specialising in reconnaissance. After that he was then deployed to the front in 1977 during which he and other 14 comrades were given the mission to spy on Rhodesian government institutions, installations and movement of the racist regime security forces in Salisbury now Harare. Below are excerpts of the interview:
MS: First of all Cde Ncube can you tell us about your training in reconnaissance and your first deployment to the operational zones.
Cde Ncube: After undergoing a six-month military training exercise at CGT1 in Zambia I was one of the 360 comrades who were identified to do a further three-month training exercise, this time specialising in reconnaissance. From our group other comrades were sent to specialise in artillery and military engineering. We did that training at the nearby CGT1 Extension Camp where the camp commander was Cde Tshibi who was deputised by Cde Elliot. Some of the instructors there were Wilson and Ronald.
MS: What does the training manual of reconnaissance officers involve?
Cde Ncube: A reconnaissance officer should be able to get beyond the enemy lines without being detected. Reconnaissance units should also assess the strength of the enemy forces, type of weapons they are carrying, the set-up of the enemy camp, deployment, the terrain, habits of the enemy among important issues to be noticed. After that the unit would go back and brief others. Using that report an analysis of the enemy would be made and strategies to attack the enemy mapped out.
Reconnoitering is not a picnic because one should be thorough when observing the enemy forces and also do his sketching of the situation accurately.
MS: Suppose you are asked to get inside the enemy camp, is that possible?
Cde Ncube: Very possible but difficult. However, if given such a mission, you have to move inside the enemy premises at night, that is the easier way and we did that during the struggle. Under such circumstances you will be looking out for how the enemy troops change guard duties, normally guard troops change duties after about two hours.
But after taking over the guard duties a soldier might take between 30 and 45 minutes to get used to the environment surrounding him. What we also realised during our operations during the armed struggle was that the whole camp used to depend on the guard soldiers at night as the rest would be asleep. So we exploited such situations to our advantage.
The enemy forces also used to follow a certain path when going to take over guard duties or when leaving. As for us, the Zipra reconnaissance units we used to wear certain type of combat depending on the terrain and the season we were in. If going for an urban operation we would be wearing civilian clothing.
MS: Let me take you back, tell us about your deployment after completing your training.
Cde Ncube: I was deployed in 1977 and our crossing point was at BL1 between Kariba and Chirundu Bridge. We were four platoons of reconnaissance units, meaning that we were 40 because the reconnaissance teams had a platoon of 10 men compared to that of an infantry, which had about 30 men including the command element.
Our unit was further broken into five men, which was called a squad. From the 40 men, the other two platoons crossed at BL2 as they were going to another operational area. But I think it is important to say that for comrades using those crossing points going for operations in Mashonaland West and Central it was a very difficult task because of the terrain.
MS: What was so difficult about that terrain?
Cde Ncube: Aah! The sight of the Zambezi River would just make some comrades fall sick despite the fact that we had been drilled in obstacles of dealing with river crossing.
MS: So take us through the crossing process.
Cde Ncube: You know for us Zipra guerillas the Zambezi River was a very powerful enemy that affected the speed and precision of executing our operations. So what would happen when coming to our operational areas was that each man would be carrying his own ammunition, food, clothing, shells of bazookas and mortars, ama 82 and 60mms for our troops who were already on the ground operating.
So on our first crossing mission we were guided by about 27 guerillas who had been operating in Hurungwe for some time and we were lucky to have them. They had gone to the Zambezi to receive their supplies. So on that particular day we crossed the river at about 2am to avoid the Rhodesians, but after crossing we took two days to reach the Zambezi escarpment, which was normal but unbearable. After that we moved to reach the gorges where we made use of the animal tracks.
However, that was another dangerous point as at the gorges that’s where the Rhodesian forces usually deployed their stop groups. So comrades would put up for the night at that place, leave early and move for another day until they reached the Kariba Road. Crossing the Kariba Road also meant being careful as it was and is still a busy road. After the Kariba Road which usually was on the third day after crossing the Zambezi the guerillas would reach the range of mountains, from that point guerillas would take three more days to reach a mountain we named Tsororo.
After that it would take a day to reach the villages. So on my first assignment when we reached villages at Mvuti West in Hurungwe we were linked up with veteran guerillas who had been on the ground commanded by Cde Chipikiri. In fact there were quite a number of our forces in that area moving in numbers of between nine and 18.
MS: How long did you stay there?
Cde Ncube: We didn’t stay long because our mission was to get to Harare. Cde Chipikiri then referred us to another group of guerillas who were under the command of Cde Mbandi. When we left Zambia we the reconnaissance unit had been told to link up with a businessman whom the guerillas called Mangena, which was a pseudo name, he was a local and a good contact of our forces. So we went to his place near the Hurungwe Table Mountain.
He gave us pairs of overalls marked Rhodesia Railways. He then took us in his Land Rover and drove us to Highfields in Harare. He took 10 of us, but remember there was another 10, those were also taken to Harare but they had their own mission. As for the 10 of us we were split into squads of five each and in my team I had Kudakwashe, Dreamer, Zvenyika and Sikhumbuzo who was also called Wilfred. I was in charge of my squad and we were taken to the house of senior Zapu member, Cde Kenneth Mano. He took us in and looked after us.
MS: So now we have five grown up men in Cde Mano’s house, didn’t that raise eyebrows especially among the neighbours?
Cde Ncube: He told his neighbours that we were his relatives. Our job was made much easier by Kuda and Zvenyika who were Shona speakers and they were from Hurungwe. You know a lot of boys from Hurungwe found it easier to cross into Zambia, so a majority of them fought on the Zipra side. We stayed there on the pretext that we were looking for employment.
In fact one of Cde Mano’s neighbours got Cdes Kuda and Dreamer jobs at a clothing factory and they started working while the three of us continued doing our task of sniffing for information on the operations of the Rhodesians. In the evenings we would sit down and discuss what we had gathered, the three of us who were not employed would spend the day gathering information while those two also excploited their situation of working at a factory to get intelligence. It was a tricky situation.
MS: What was your real mission in Harare?
Cde Ncube: It was to spy on the deployment of security forces in Harare, to capture if possible any government official. Our targets in this case were the soldiers, police officers and politicians on the side the Smith regime. If we were to come across them we were to capture them. The other group of five which was under the command of Sikiza was to spy on government institutions especially major installations.
However, for us the situation was so tense that it was not easy to carry out assassinations of members of the security forces because at that time most of them were housed in camps. Cde Mano then received a call from Zambia ordering us to go back to the rear. This was after three months. Mangena then came for us and left us in Hurungwe where we were joined by 40 other guerillas who were going for supplies, the torturous journey started again. On our way back we were collecting reports from field commanders about their operations. We took those reports to the Zipra headquarters for the senior commanders’ attention.
MS: On your arrival back in Zambia what happened?
Cde Ncube: We reported our operation to Cde China, who is now Colonel Moyo and is still serving in the army. He was one of the senior officers in the reconnaissance unit. Cde China in turn reported to the Zipra Chief of Reconnaissance, Cde Ananias Gwenzi, now the army commander, Lt-Gen Philip Valerio Sibanda. PV was not impressed saying although we had managed to gather good information on the operations of the enemy forces and the general situation in Harare, at least we should have made our presence felt by attacking a government premise.
He then told us in no uncertain terms that we should return to Harare and perform. He told us that when we return to Harare we should make our presence known and make the enemy aware that we have taken the war the capital city. He told us that he expected results this time around.
MS: What then was the next move?
Cde Ncube: We returned to Hurungwe but this time Cde Mangena gave us another Zapu contact as he was now under the spotlight and that man drove us back to Harare in his car. However, that contact just dropped us on the outskirts of Harare.
We then went to the Snake Park to plan our operations. After that we went to a dumpsite where we waylaid a refuse collection vehicle. When those guys drove in to dump the waste we pounced on them and took away their vehicle. We left them tied up.
We then drove to Kuwadzana Police Base where the police officers thought it was just an innocent refuse removal crew.
When we got there we fired a volley of bullets at the administration block. We also shelled it while one of our comrades took care of the officer who was at the gate.
Although it happened in a few minutes we left the place in a mess with panic all over. We drove off and returned to the dumpsite where we found the refuse crew still in shock. To instill more fear in them we gave the refuse removal truck driver a live bullet.
Next week we continue the interview with Cde Ncube talking about how they managed to get out of Harare after their attack on the police station. He will also talk his operations in the Chegutu area and Guruve.
