The Sunday News
In the month of January 1977 Jason Ziyapapa Moyo (JZ) was tragically killed by a parcel bomb in the Zapu office in Lusaka, Zambia. The mystery surrounding his death remains to this day: was it the Rhodesians or some internal work often referred to as struggles within the struggle? In the past two weeks Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu delved into the issue with a view to identifying possible assassin(s). The facts given are not in dispute. However, this article takes a different and broader analysis and interpretation of the calamitous death. I argue that it is more fruitful and practical to identify blameworthy interests and systems rather that pinpointing an individual.
My view is that it is more pertinent to seek to identify the interests and system that was responsible for his death. Quite often assassinations are executed in such a way that the blameworthiness is attributed to the innocent. In the case of JZ we have to scrutinise events that preceded his death and events that followed and, in the process, seek to be as objective as possible. The starting point is to appreciate and locate the armed liberation struggle in a broader international context. My view is that there were actors and players who manipulated and influenced events at the local level.
Our struggle had interested parties beyond the Zimbabwean politico-economic theatre. The hot cold war context cannot be dismissed. The Rhodesians were well networked with and linked to kith and kin in the Western world whose primary preoccupation was to prevent the Soviet Union and its Communist allies in the Warsaw Pact from securing a strong foothold in geopolitically important southern Africa. The cold war translated into deadly struggles and contestations in the mid-70s for reasons that will be furnished below.
Following the internal strife within Zapu from about 1969 to 1971, JZ became leader of the section that retained Zapu’s identity. The other splinter groups were the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (Frolizi) and the March 11 Movement. With James Robert Dambaza Chikerema, JZ became the epitome and shining beacon of the armed struggle within exiled Zapu.
Zapu re-organised, creating various co-ordinated units such as the War Council, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZPRA), all of which were affiliated to the Revolutionary Council. In ideological terms Zapu formally adopted the Marxist-Leninist ideology through its Ideological Concept spearhead by George Silundika.
The army and civilian components were better co-ordinated with Nikita Mangena as Chief of Staff and effectively being the commander of the army. Civilian leaders underwent some rudimentary military training, a move that closed ranks between the two. The armed struggle was taken to a higher level in terms of new operational departments that were created, the number of cadres joining the struggle and the range and sophistication of weapons that the Soviet Union supplied. That was accompanied by improved training in military camps that were established within Zambia. There was more advanced training in the Soviet Union itself and other Warsaw Pact countries such as Romania and Czechoslovakia.
Military rejuvenation of Zapu was complemented by the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army — Zanla’s thrust in the north east. Within the cold war context Western countries felt threatened. Their concerns were further exacerbated by the General Spinola-led coup in Portugal whose result was, in 1975, attainment of independence by Mozambique and Angola.
That meant there was a real possibility of Soviet control and influence extending from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean.
That development became a real political possibility that prompted the United States of America to get involved through its Secretary of State Dr Henry Kissinger. Détente was his response which sought to apply brakes to the pace of the armed struggle. Nationalist leaders were released from detention in December 1974. Dr Kissinger envisaged fallout between the nationalists and those leading the exiled wings of the liberation movements.
Indeed, the resulting rivalry and mistrust became the basis upon which some people entertained the possibility of JZ’s death being an internal job. There was an ideological chasm between the two groups, the nationalists and the guerrillas, particularly during the incumbency of Mangena. JZ worked well with the military, in particular with Mangena and his military High Command. The nationalists did not embrace Marxism-Leninism. It does appear for them the struggle was about replacing the white rulers. Liberation was not fully embraced.
Independence for Mozambique and Angola led to the liberation movements having some cadres train in those countries.
ZPRA did train cadres in Angola from 1977 and each group comprised more than 2 000 recruits. Rhodesians and their backers felt threatened by the new developments. They were aware that the Soviets were arming ZPRA with sophisticated military arsenal including Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM 7). Among the liberation movements backed by the Soviets and their allies ZPRA was the best equipped militarily. Detente led to constitutional talks at Geneva in 1976 intended to douse the flames of the struggle fires raging in most parts of Rhodesia.
Geneva Talks aborted
The disappointed British and their allies identified the stumbling blocks to the successful conclusion of the talks. Some of these radicals, including JZ and Mangena were targeted for elimination so as to clear the way for a sellout peaceful settlement.
That indeed materialised in the year following the assassination of JZ when Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was born.
Let us now look at the Rhodesians and their operations as this will provide background to the events leading to JZ’s death.
The Special Branch (SB) had played a key role in the formation of the intelligence organisation at the time when Zambia became independent in 1964. From that year the Special Branch was replaced by the Ken Flower-led Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). What that meant was that the liberation movements operating from Zambia, following their relocation from Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania, were under the watchful eye and surveillance of the CIO agents in Lusaka. Among their briefs were to ferment rivalry between Zapu and Zanu and internal animosities within each movement.
The CIO did not operate in isolation.
It was well networked with and linked to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Israeli MOSAD, the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and the British MI5 and MI6. Intelligence information was shared as there were agents in the Frontline States capitals.
There were ZPRA cadres who were captured and politically worked on. They were then turned against their former fellow fighters and rejoined ZPRA on the side of the Rhodesians. Such turned in cadres were given signs through which they identified each other. The way they held cigarettes was one such communication signal. Links between these turncoats and the Rhodesians were maintained right into independence.
The Rhodesians recruited beautiful young ladies to be agents in neighbouring countries. Some were professional persons employed in institutions such as banks. Others were sent to “join” the liberation struggle but when they got to the training camps they sought excuses so that would see them get passes to proceed to bigger hospitals in Lusaka where top Zapu/ZPRA officials lived. In most cases they feigned complications relating to sexual health matters. The beautiful ladies managed to dupe ZPRA medics in transit camps.
Related to this was the fact that Zapu had taken a decision that top officials, both civilian and military, were not going to marry or live with women. That injunction was not strictly adhered to as many of them were known to have girlfriends. The best known case was that of Edward Ndlovu who married a white lady, a move that for some temporarily soured relations between him and JZ. As will be demonstrated later, this became the Achilles heel for the Zapu/ZPRA leadership in exile. As Saul Gwakuba Ndlovu did point out in last week’s instalment in the Sunday News, Ethan Dube, who was in charge of civilian intelligence up to 1974, met his death when Selous Scouts operating within Botswana captured him following treachery by a girlfriend in Francistown.
The year 1974 saw ZPRA open the Southern Front (SF) which saw the Rhodesian forces having to defend more operational zones. ZPRA could then infiltrate guerrillas through the Southern Front and spirited out injured combatants through the same route. Rhodesians ratcheted their counter insurgency operations and sought to capture some top Zapu and ZPRA cadres who travelled along the Rhodesia-Botswana border or flew into Francistown. Dumiso Dabengwa was one such person that they sought to capture. They did, however, capture Black Swine (Sibanda).
The Rhodesians set up disguised companies especially along the Zambezi River. The companies purported to be tourist enterprises when in actual fact they were engaged in gathering intelligence on the movements of ZPRA cadres over the border. Some were created in various cities such as Bulawayo where key staff were agents reporting to top company officials who too were intelligence operatives.
Postal boxes were strategically placed in several locations within cities such as Bulawayo. Informers “posted” information relating to nationalist activities and guerrilla movements. Also related to the recruitment of agents and informers were truck drivers who were plying the route between Zimbabwe and Botswana. These drivers served as couriers of intelligence to underground operatives in Botswana, particularly in Francistown where top ZPRA officials in the Southern Front were located.
Within the post offices both in Zambia and Botswana there were agents that were recruited to facilitate safe movement of letter bombs. It should be realised that JZ was not the first liberation cadre to be killed by a parcel bomb. Eduardo Mondlane, the leader of FRELIMO, met his death in similar circumstances. Ruth First of the African National Congress (ANC) was another victim. The Rhodesians thus had the technology to open letters from known girlfriends and replace contents with deadly bombs.
At the time Zapu possessed a letter-scanning machine. But there was expected laxity when it came to letters bearing the handwriting of a known lady such as Masibhikiri.
