‘The ZPRA spine was at Mulungushi’

WE conclude our interview with former ZPRA Brigade Political Commissar, Colonel (Rtd) Marshal Mhambi Mpofu pseudonym Cde Lameck Mathe or Marshal Longfield. In our last week’s edition, Col (Rtd) Mpofu told our Assistant Editor Mkhululi Sibanda (MS) how the ZPRA Brigade stationed at Mulungushi was structured with Dr Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo in the company of Ambassadors from Cuba and then German Democratic Republic (GDR) announcing the command structure. Now Brigadier-General (Rtd) Tjile Nleya was appointed the commander of the First Brigade. In today’s interview, Col (Rtd) Mpofu narrates how the Rhodesians started bombing Mulungushi in a bid to decimate the brigade. He will also speak about the deployment of the battalions along the Zambezi River as the war intensified.  

MS: You spoke about the battalions being drilled on co-ordination while awaiting deployment, let’s resume the conversation from there.

Col (Rtd) Mpofu: Like I said the battalions were not kept in one place, but we strategically and technically positioned them in anticipation of the Rhodesian attacks. As I anticipated the Rhodesians started carrying out aerial raids on Mulungushi, I can say of all the camps Mulungushi experienced more bombardments. At times we were bombed two or three times a day and this was meant to decimate the force that we were building. 

MS: How did you respond to the attacks?

Col (Rtd) Mpofu: If there is a camp that the Rhodesians failed to penetrate it was Mulungushi. Every time they came for their aerial raids they were repelled because that’s where ZPRA was at its strongest. The backbone or spine of the ZPRA force was at Mulungushi and even our Commander-in-Chief and Zapu President, Dr Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo when getting reports about the bombings at Mulungushi, will say “yekela laphana baqondane labo sowabo”, meaning that he was not all that bothered as the Rhodesians were up against their match.

MS: How was the brigade armed?

Col (Rtd) Mpofu: The brigade was equipped, which equally cascaded to the battalions with a range of armament from AK-47, machine guns, and bazookas. As for the support or integral units they were armed with anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and artillery weapons. To be specific on anti-tank weapons we had RPGs, Gun 75mm, Gun 76 mm and B10s. As for the anti-aircraft weapons we had Zegues 14,5 mm single and double barrels.  We also had Zegues two barrels  23mm, which had been provided by the Zambian contingent that had been deployed to Mulungushi during the training exercise to provide security. We also had sections of Strella, that is the Surface to Air Missile 7 (SAM-7). There were also mortar bomb platoons armed with the 82mm, 57mm and 76mm. In addition to all that heavy military equipment we also had a section for the 122mm weapons, the Grad-P, which was used by the Madliwa Battalion during the seven-day battle near Kariba.  That’s why we were able to repel the Rhodesians whenever they raided Mulungushi. The battalions were eventually deployed along the Zambezi River and that was in 1979. The First under Madliwa was deployed near Kariba, the fourth under Soneni in Feira, the second under Zuba next to Madliwa’s but at a distance and the third under Jack Matiwaza was stationed to the far right.

MS: When the battalions were deployed what happened to you?

Col (Rtd) Mpofu: I was deployed to the Headquarters in Lusaka to work in the newly created Department of Psychological Warfare which was known as the Mobilisation Committee so that it didn’t raise eyebrows and also that it looked harmless. This department was headed by the now-late National Hero, Cde Swazini Ndlovu, who was one of the directors of the National Order and Security (NSO) headed by Dumiso Dabengwa. It was a six or seven-member committee and the other person was Alfred Ndlovu from NSO again. 

MS: What exactly were you doing?

Col (Rtd) Mpofu: Our duties entailed following up on enemy activities, producing pamphlets laced with our propaganda and appealing to those in Rhodesia including blacks to turn against the system. In brief, we were bent on unsettling the enemy. We were manufacturing propaganda. I should mention that as for Cephas Khuphe or SB Sibanda he joined the operations department as a deputy alongside Stanley Gagisa and Richard Mataure, they were deputising the now late Mike Reynolds (Brigadier-General Charles Grey), who had taken over from Tshangane (Jevan Maseko) as Chief of Operations. Tshangane had been promoted to the rank of Chief of Staff.

MS: You joined the armed struggle in the early 70s, there is this talk that Mangena and Dabengwa were rivals. How far true is that?

Col (Rtd) Mpofu: Mangena and Dabengwa rivals, how? Mangena was the commander of the army, ZPRA while Dabengwa was the director of the intelligence arm of Zapu, the NSO. The two were playing different but complementary roles, so from my observation I never saw any rivalry between the two. What those who are raising such talk should know is that Mangena had his own deputies in the army and Dabengwa was not one of them. The same applies to the intelligence arm, Dabengwa was the boss and Mangena was not the deputy. No one was above the other and like I said their roles were complementary, period.

MS: Then there is also the issue of the tension that I am told existed between the regular soldiers and the guerillas. What was causing such things?

Col (Rtd) Mpofu: I am glad that I experienced both fields, I was trained and operated as a guerilla. I was then withdrawn from the front and sent to Mulungushi to be part of the officers who assisted the Zambians in training our conventional forces. What I can say is that a guerilla is an armed politician, besides engaging the enemy in combat, guerillas were taught to analyse the situation and make a decision on the field without consulting anybody. That comes with the difference, regular troops work on orders from the commander, who plans, organises and issues the command. The regular forces are also taught to capture and hold the ground while guerillas carefully choose a target to hit and that should be successful as well as having an impact on the enemy. So the little differences might have been caused by such backgrounds. As for the Mulungushi the training manual or syllabus was purely conventional, but I had to ask the Zambians to remove some things such as boxing.

MS: What was the reason for that?

Col (Rtd) Mpofu: In military training, boxing is used to develop aggression in a soldier. I thought for salaried soldiers there was nothing wrong with that, but for volunteers like ourselves, I realised that was going to create enmity from within. After engaging in boxing, the defeated guy would be nursing a grudge against the person who has beaten him up. Then you deploy the two in battle, things might go wrong there. My argument was that we could not engineer aggression in our soldiers from such things as boxing but we could do that through the political sphere as we were fighting a racist system and the Zambians understood us.

MS: Then came the time of the ceasefire. Take us through that period.

Col (Rtd) Mpofu: I was part of the first group of guerillas to touch down at the then Salisbury Airport on 25 December 1979 accompanying ZPRA commander, Lookout Masuku who was called Lameck Mafela during the war. Gen Masuku had asked me to organise officers who will form the advance party with him and our delegation was made up of between 26 and 30 officers. We arrived on the same day with the Zanla delegation, but as the ZPRA contingent, we arrived earlier as we touched down at the airport at around 2pm. 

MS: Besides Gen Masuku and yourself of course who were some of the comrades who were part of the first group?

Col (Rtd) Mpofu: There was our Chief of Staff, now late Major-General Jevan Maseko, the Chief of Communications, Embassy (Col Tshinga Dube), Mafilisto, Walker, Ndimande, now late Brigadier-General Ray Maponga, Cephas Khuphe and other comrades, I am forgetting their names.    

MS: You had left the country in 1972 and what was going through your mind as you returned home? Were you guys not afraid that the Rhodesians might violate the ceasefire agreement?

Col (Rtd) Mpofu: A decision had been taken to stop the war and as soldiers, we had to follow the orders that had been issued. In case of mistrust it was there and emerging from the bush and being flown home was something else. Of course, we had personal weapons such as pistols and AK-47s. When we got to the airport we found a very big crowd waiting for us and among the politicians, there was Cde William Kona, a Zapu member from the Midlands. From the airport, we were driven to Mt Pleasant. Zanla colleagues arrived later in the evening. The Rhodesians and members of the Monitoring Force looked in awe when they saw our communication guys setting up their equipment and communicating directly with our headquarters in Lusaka. They could not hide their admiration for us.  

MS: What was the next step?

Col (Rtd) Mpofu: The following day we moved to Braeside Hall, that is ourselves and Zanla colleagues where we were addressed by the commander of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force, Major-General John Acland. The meeting had been called to discuss a few things such as the dispositions of the Assembly Points (APs) and a few adjustments were made. I was then deployed to the Midlands Province as a liaison officer with the role of going around explaining to the guerillas that the war was over.