The Sunday News
TODAY we enter the fourth instalment of our interviews with former Zipra zone commander, Cde Wilson Dube pseudonym Cde Jonas Donga in the operational area code named Northern Front Three (NF3) which covered Mashonaland West and Central provinces.
Cde Dube at some point of the armed struggle found himself enjoying the privilege of commanding both Zipra and Zanla troops when he and his Zanla counterpart, Cde Kapenga Wehondo (Colonel Blessing Kashiri) agreed on carrying out joint operations in Guruve then Sipolilo in Mashonaland Central.
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In the past instalments Cde Dube has told our Assistant Editor Mkhululi Sibanda (MS) on how he joined the armed struggle, training in Zambia and the then Soviet Union and last week narrated how he was deployed to Hurungwe District in Mashonaland West.
He continues the narration by talking about his arrival in Kazangarara area in Hurungwe.
Below are excerpts of the interview. Read on . . .
MS: Last time you were still telling us about your arrival in Kazangarara, take us through that.
Cde Dube: Like I said it was not easy reaching the villages from the Zambezi River as guerillas would take two or so days negotiating their way in the Zambezi Escarpment before reaching the flat ground.
Anyway after arriving in the first villages after walking for five days from the Zambezi River we found some comrades there.
Among those were Zanda, Matindane, Xabanisa, James, Brown and Kerias.
I was coming in to take over the command of the area.
When I got there in a unit of about 20 comrades we found that the guerillas had good relations with the masses of Kazangarara.
The villagers there were very supportive of the struggle and there were strong party structures those of Zapu which made our operations easy.
When we got there it was early 1978.
MS: In terms of operations how was the situation?
Cde Dube: When we got to the ground we found the comrades had scored a big operation that of closing down Shamrock Mine, which was also used by the Rhodesians as a spring board to launch their operations against the guerillas.
What had happened was that the guerillas we found there had raided Shamrock Mine and told workers who included supervisors to leave the mine immediately.
I was told that when they got there they found black workers as the white bosses were staying in Karoi.
Because of the war situation the white bosses were commuting to and from the mine daily under the escort of the Rhodesian forces.
When the comrades raided Shamrock Mine they went to the stores where they took whatever they wanted which included clothing that is khakis, stings, tennis shoes, cigarettes and other provisions.
They then told the black supervisors that they did not want anyone at the mine, all the people had to leave.
MS: Was there some form of security at the mine? It looks like the guerillas did that with ease.
Cde Dube: The mine was guarded by security guards, your ordinary security guards without any military skill.
Those guards did not offer any form of resistance, in fact some even ran away in fear.
However, after that the whites tried to resume operations but we stopped that.
I had arrived when we carried out a follow-up operation.
MS: Tell us about that operation.
Cde Dube: After realising that the whites were still going to the mine we decided to lay an ambush at a strategic spot along the Karoi-Shamrock Mine.
I remember the Rhodesians had an Armoured Personnel Car (APC) and a truck.
I think they got to our ambush position at around 10am.
We hit the APC with an RPG7, a bazooka.
It was an accurate shot from Cde Brown as the APC caught fire and we started firing at both the truck and APC.
The Rhodesians were caught flat-footed and I called for withdrawal after noticing that we had done much damage and also we were afraid that their helicopters might come.
It was my first contact with the enemy after my arrival from Zambia.
We were very satisfied with our work and also we did not have any casualties, no one was injured from our unit.
We were later told by the villagers that some Rhodesian soldiers had come in the afternoon to collect their causalities.
However, it was not clear how many died or were injured.
In a guerillas warfare, guerillas have no time to check on what becomes of the enemy during the battle, you inflict damage and withdraw.
The trick is to keep the enemy guessing and uncomfortable.
Immediately after that we had another successful contact also in Hurungwe.
It had rained heavily on that day and in the late afternoon to the evening it was drizzling.
In that area homesteads were situated in between two mountains, in fact the area was generally hilly.
The Rhodesian forces were aware of our presence as we believe some people had told them and also we had been told that they were nearby.
In fact they knew the exact spot where we were.
From where we were we saw them going up a mountain. They set base there.
MS: What was going through your minds when you saw them doing that?
Cde Dube: A lot was going through our minds; one was to go for them but we quickly realised that they were at an advantage as they could see us coming up the mountain.
Their positioning in general gave them an advantage. So we decided to keep watch on the situation.
We had realised that the Rhodesians were buying time as they thought that they could catch us at night, they had that belief that guerillas slept at homesteads.
I think they anticipated that because of the rains, it could have been their feeling that we would put up in the homesteads because of the wet conditions.
But guerillas in our region did not put up in the homesteads, I never slept in a homestead until the ceasefire.
Even when having meals, we never had them in the homesteads, the villagers would bring them at a chosen spot away from the homestead. After that we would move and put up somewhere, far away.
Of course in other operational areas it was common for the comrades to sleep in the homesteads, but not with us.
Coming back to our mind games with the Rhodesians on that day, we also kept them guessing on our next move.
MS: How many were you?
Cde Dube: We were 15, among the 15 were comrades such as Kerias, Majikane, Africa, Brown and so on.
Then came time for the Rhodesians to prepare their meals and that could have been after 6pm.
That is when we thought we could go for the attack, we knew that they would not go to sleep without eating, so we went for them when they thought we would not attack.
We had read their minds that they thought we would not initiate the attack but it would be them to go on the offensive.
While we were still pondering on what to do they left the spot where they were.
We thought they were going to the road to get transport to take them back to Karoi.
We were monitoring their moves, they followed a thicket and they got to a hill where it became obvious that they wanted to put up for the night.
They deployed in a battle formation. As a unit we decided to approach them in an L-formation.
I was on the western side moving with Kerias and Mnkandla. Mnkandla was in between us.
As it was now dark, we almost stumbled on them. What happened was that Mnkandla was hooked by a rope of a tent
. That was followed by a sudden burst of gunfire, a bullet ripped through Mnkandla’s shirt missing him by a whisker.
Then a comrade from the other side fired a bazooka and fighting ensued.
When we withdrew all was quiet from the enemy side.
There was no qhwa qhwa . . . . kwakuthe ziii. That night we had a good sleep.
The following day two helicopters arrived in the area escorting an army truck.
They had come to pick the bodies and the injured.
It was in battles such as these that made the Rhodesians remark that Hurungwe was a terrorist territory.
The district became a semi-liberated zone.
MS: In such instances how did the enemy respond especially towards the masses?
Cde Dube: They introduced amaKeep, the protected villages where they were ordering the povo to go and stay.
In our area of operation it became a serious offence for the villagers to sleep at their homesteads.
They had to go and spend the night kumaKeep. It was the enemy’s strategy meant to stop us from attacking it at night.
They were now using the masses as human shield. Also upon suffering losses on the battlefield the Rhodesians were coming to the villagers pretending to be freedom fighters, those were Selous Scouts.
They would say they have just arrived from Zambia and were looking for other comrades.
The villagers who had a good security network with the guerillas would sell them dummies and then come and tell us that there were suspicious looking people.
The enemy was not aware that a new unit would not just descend on a village on its own, it had to be in the company of veteran guerillas who were known by the villagers.
As guerillas on the ground we also had a way of communicating, we would know that a unit was coming. It was not just from the blue.
MS: So how long were you in Hurungwe?
Cde Dube: I left some time in 1978 when I was recalled to Feira by Rodwell Nyika.
When I got there he told me that I had been promoted to zone commander and I had to move to Sipolilo now Guruve.
When I left Hurungwe the number of guerillas had grown up, we had about three distinct units of detachment strength under the command of
Cdes Nyere, Njabulo and Zanda. In Mgunje we also had big units and one of the commanders there was Cde Friday.
To be continued next week with Cde Dube talking about his operations in Guruve which resulted in Zipra and Zanla carrying out joint operations.
